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# Swedish Security Policy at a Crossroads

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Captain Jörgen Ericsson, Royal Swedish Navy

**N**OW IS THE TIME TO DETERMINE future Swedish security policy. Sweden's newly gained membership in the European Union (or EU, until 1994 the European Community, or EC) is the foundation on which a new, or altered, Swedish security policy can be built.<sup>1</sup> Sweden's political and military leadership confronts today, without doubt, one of the most important decisions concerning future security policy that it has faced in several decades. Should Sweden remain nonaligned in peacetime, claiming neutrality in war? Or should Sweden engage itself in both the economic and security policies of the emerging new Europe? These questions define the two main alternatives Sweden has to choose between: either to continue to be "alone by herself" or to take an active part in a regional security arrangement within the EU.

Analysis and assessment of current Swedish security policy and the main factors that will influence future policy suggest that Sweden ought to adopt a policy of greater engagement in the common security of Europe. Such a change in direction would make the objectives of Swedish national security policy more achievable. Moreover, many Swedes believe their nation has a duty to shoulder a share of responsibility for the common security of Europe. Sweden has the economic, diplomatic, and military means necessary to do so. These resources could help make Europe into a more stable, democratic, and peaceful region, marked by cooperation between the members of the EU.

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## **The Objectives Remain—Can the Means Be Changed?**

During the past few years, Europe has undergone more sudden and profound political changes than the continent has experienced in any other peacetime period during the last two centuries. In the post-Cold War era the risk of a major war has decreased considerably. The relatively stable bipolar system, which embodied that risk, no longer exists. However, Europe today can be characterized as more secure but less peaceful. This change is underlined by the war in former Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflicts within and between republics of the former Soviet Union. Hence, though the balance of power between Nato and the Warsaw Pact did involve a greater likelihood of a major war, it was at the same time a balance that deterred regional crises. The absence of this deterrence today signifies a greater risk that bilateral and internal disputes can develop, in a short time, into regional crises or conflicts. Thus, for Sweden, while the end of the Cold War has positive implications, there are still problems, uncertainties, and unknowns.

In addition to these external changes (and to a certain degree because of them), Sweden, together with Finland and Austria, has applied to, negotiated with, and eventually voted to join the EU; it assumed membership in January 1995. These political shifts, bringing membership in the Union, have fundamentally altered the foundations of Sweden's security policy. The new situation implies a requirement for Sweden to analyze carefully how to accomplish its objectives within the context of the EU.

These objectives are clearly stated: "The purpose of Sweden's security policy is ultimately to defend the freedom and national independence of our country. We will in all situations and ways that we choose ensure our freedom of action so that we can develop our society in political, economic, social, cultural and other ways. An important component of our security policy is to work externally for defusing of tension, arms reduction, cooperation and democratic development."<sup>2</sup> Swedish security policy also emphasizes the objective of maintaining a lasting peace and stability in Scandinavia and surrounding areas, with the ultimate goal of removing any risk of Sweden becoming involved in or affected by war.<sup>3</sup>

Up to now, the principal means of achieving these objectives have consisted of staying free from military alliances in peacetime, claiming neutrality in war, and maintaining relatively strong defense forces. Furthermore, Sweden and its armed forces have emphasized the importance of an active part in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Sweden is also a keen member of the Organization for (formerly, Conference on) Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Swedish society has fully accepted this policy as the means to accomplish its security objectives; it has over a long period of years become deeply rooted. Most importantly, the policy has been very successful: Sweden has not

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participated in any war since the beginning of the nineteenth century. By tradition and necessity, there has always been a strong national consensus concerning security policy, even among politicians with very different ideologies. All this makes it particularly hard for current and future Swedish leaders to begin a process of reconsidering solutions; it will take considerable courage. However, there are objective military arguments that should encourage political leaders to do so.

During the Cold War, Swedish military strategy was founded on the assumption that any major war in Europe that affected Sweden would largely absorb the capacity of the two superpowers, of whose military resources only a small part could be diverted to assault Sweden. On that premise, the nation's armed forces would have had strength enough to deter or to defeat alone such an assault. This military strategy, "the margin doctrine," became obsolete with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The margin doctrine has been replaced by a new strategy that concentrates on the ability of highly prepared and ready forces to deter or defeat a "strategic assault" from small but highly mobile forces striking at the military and civilian command structure; once fully mobilized, the armed forces are to be able to counter a major assault.

In 1992, a Parliamentary Defense Decision confirmed the new military strategy. It also provided for a small increase in the defense budget in order to maintain and develop defensive capabilities and to afford freedom of action for the Defense Department force structure decisions to be made in 1996. Thus, the politicians have laid down a good basis for reconsidering Swedish security policy.

### The European Union Treaty and Swedish Security Policy

In addition to the potential threat and Sweden's geostrategic situation, another important factor to examine in reconsidering Swedish security policy is the development planned for the EU and the demands that will make on the members and, above all, on Sweden.

The Maastricht meeting of December 1991 laid the foundation of the European Union. According to the resulting European Union Treaty, the members of the European Community agreed for the future not only upon a free market and a monetary union (a common currency) but also upon what is known as the Common Foreign and Security Policy. As a consequence of that agreement, the defense component of the EC, known as the Western European Union (WEU), was revitalized as the prospective security organ of the Union, responsible for planning and implementing all defense matters. The treaty

prescribes that these military measures shall be harmonized with Nato and with the individual defense commitments of the signatories. This process is to be implemented as a long-term policy, in a series of phases.<sup>4</sup>

Bilateral or multilateral arrangements may be made within the framework of the WEU or Nato, provided they do not clash with those laid down in the European Union Treaty. At the end of December 1992, all members of EC except the Republic of Ireland became associated with the WEU, as full members or observers. The tasks of the WEU will be to form the European pillar of the transatlantic bridge, provide a forum for regional discussions of the harmonization of defense and security matters affecting Europe, develop a European defense identity, coordinate military operations of its members, and harmonize these operations with Nato.<sup>5</sup>

According to present plans, the EU and the WEU will fully integrate in 1998, with the EU as the political head. But there are still problems to be solved with, as it now seems, this overly optimistic plan. For example, Germany wants to use the Nato command and control structure, which is very effective and already available, rather than create another. France does not agree, wanting no U.S. involvement in the WEU. Germany advocates a close cooperation with Nato as the only organization that possesses a strategic lift capacity, a worldwide intelligence system, and other strengths; furthermore, Germany wants the WEU to be able to act only within a mandate given by the United Nations or the OSCE. France replies that the WEU should be able to take whatever actions its members wish, without limitations. Thus there are still many uncertainties regarding the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (or CFSP) and the WEU; however, these uncertainties also constitute possibilities for influencing the emerging cooperative security arrangement.

In addressing the issue of membership in the WEU, Swedish politicians have taken so far a very cautious attitude. In June 1992 the defense minister stated in a speech at the WEU headquarters in Paris that:

Sweden has as great an interest as any other European country in taking an active part in building up a new security architecture in Europe, in order to be able to handle, contain or solve the security threats and tensions which we are likely to face in the future. . . . As a member of the European Union, Sweden will participate fully in a common security and foreign policy, as established in the Maastricht Agreement in the autumn of 1991. As far as Sweden is concerned, this means a commitment to be responsible for our own defence so that we can remain neutral in the event of war in our vicinity. Sweden is only responsible for its own defence. . . . At the moment, the European structure of cooperation and security is at a formative stage.

There are a number of different possibilities for continued development in the 1990's. In a recent report the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Swedish Parliament stated unanimously that Sweden's policy of non-participation in military

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alliances imposes no restrictions on its participation in European cooperation, and that Sweden's security policy is characterized by active and full participation in the endeavours to fulfil the goals shared by all European nations. The Foreign Affairs committee states that "A decision concerning the issue of WEU membership is not possible before Sweden has obtained membership in the European Union. Before that, the issue is without relevance. The policy of non-participation in military alliances still remains."<sup>6</sup>

Swedish defense policy did not alter after the general election in September 1994, when the Social Democratic Party formed a new government. The new defense minister has on various occasions declared that the policy of "non-alignment in peacetime claiming neutrality in war" will not be changed, although Sweden is now a member of the EU.

This position raises at least two important military questions that Sweden needs to answer. First, is it possible to participate fully in the CFSP and, at the same time, be responsible only for the defense of Sweden? Second, is it possible to be a member of the EU and still maintain credible neutrality in the event of war? These issues are essential for determining the nation's future security policy. Before examining them, it is appropriate to address two other important factors influencing Swedish security: the strategic situation and the future threat.

During the Cold War, Scandinavia was a flank of the "Central Front" in Europe and was therefore of considerable strategic interest to both Nato and the Warsaw Pact. This importance increased as the Soviet Union built up a nuclear ballistic missile submarine force in the Kola region. With the end of the Cold War, the military-strategic connection between Scandinavia and Central Europe weakened; with an assault from Eastern Europe into Germany no longer a credible threat, the significance of Scandinavia decreased. Even so, northern Europe retains three important strategic features: its nuclear role, its maritime role, and the fact that Scandinavia has the only common border between Western Europe and Russia.

Russia's nuclear ballistic missile submarines based in the Kola region will increase in importance after implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start) provisions. Russia's ability to protect these assets and the Kola Peninsula itself will remain vital to that nation, giving great military significance to Scandinavia and the surrounding seas. This importance is underlined by the fact that the reductions in military forces that have recently occurred in Central Europe, as a result of the 1992 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, have not spread northward. There are indications that Russia continues to reinforce its capability in qualitative terms on the Kola Peninsula; the withdrawal of modern air forces from former satellite states in Europe has enabled Russia to improve and modernize units deployed on the Peninsula. In addition, Russian

shipyards continue to produce destroyers and frigates to protect the nuclear ballistic missile submarines in the Northern Fleet.<sup>7</sup>

The Nordic area—specifically the Kola Peninsula and the portions of Norway, Sweden, and Finland north of the Arctic Circle (known collectively as the “North Calotte”)—remains an important strategic region. The Swedish defense minister referred to this area in a speech at the International Air Display at Farnborough, England, in 1992: “The Kola Peninsula is a central factor in Russia’s defence. As long as Russia has some of its most vital military bases located in this area, Sweden and the North Calotte will continue to be interesting from a strategic point of view. In a war situation we can assume that the Russians may try to establish a protected zone to the west of their borders which, as we all know, is where Sweden and certain other countries happen to be situated.”<sup>8</sup> During a conference on defense policy in Sälen, Sweden, on 29 January 1995, General Ove Wiktorin, Sweden’s newly appointed Supreme Commander, made a related point.

What kind of world can we look forward to, when considering our security and defense policy? When examining the strategic interest for Sweden and Scandinavia we discover [a] paradox concerning the accomplished arms reduction within the nuclear-strategic area[:] the importance of Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula have increased. This relative shifting northward is an important part of the future strategic interest for Scandinavia and Sweden. More than 60% of Russia’s strategic nuclear capacity, compared to 25% a couple of years ago, will now be deployed in the north. The strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula brings, in its turn, a concentration of ground, sea and air units to the area. Hence, Scandinavia and Sweden will remain in the strategic [limelight] for a long time to come.

In this context, it is also appropriate to recognize that Sweden still constitutes a major [littoral state on] the Baltic Sea. The Baltic forms now, as it has for many centuries, an economic intersection-zone. Sweden and Germany are the dominating powers around the Baltic, neighbouring Poland, the three fragile Baltic States, Russia and the Kaliningrad Oblast. The Baltic is Russia’s gateway to the West and has, as such, increased in strategic importance.<sup>9</sup>

### Four Main Actors Shape the Europe of Tomorrow

For some considerable time in the future, security policy in Europe and hence for Sweden will be dominated by four entities: Russia, the EU and WEU collectively, Nato, and (probably playing a lesser role) the OSCE. Their interactions with each other will define reactions to future threats and so will have an impact on Sweden’s defense planning.

Consider, first, Russia. The breakdown of the Soviet Union opened up promising opportunities for peace and democracy, but there is a major risk that these opportunities will evaporate. The collapse of the Soviet Union left its main

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successor in a state of political and economic disintegration. Several ethnic conflicts exist within Russia, some of which verge on civil war or have already degenerated into combat. Russia also has disputes with its neighbors over the distribution of the USSR's military assets, including the fleet and enormous stocks of nuclear and conventional armaments. These disputes will probably remain a source of political and military tension for a long time to come. Another cause of irritation and uncertainty is the large number of ethnic Russians living outside Russia, in such states as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine. Russian politicians have, on various occasions and in more or less harsh words, emphasized Moscow's interest in protecting the well-being of these ethnic Russians.

Scholars and other experts have written at length about developments in Russia. Most describe the risks connected with the evolution of a democratic and peaceful Russia with a functioning market economy. A former American national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, put it this way in 1994: "Unfortunately, considerable evidence suggests that the near-term prospects for a stable Russian democracy are not very promising. The growing political influence of the Russian army, especially in Russia's foreign policy, is not reassuring."<sup>10</sup>

The counterpoise to Russia is now Nato and the EU (including the WEU), which have a great interest in trying to guide Russia on the proper path. Nato is concerned with military security, stability, controlled disarmament, and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The EU shares, for obvious reasons, these concerns but sees also great economic issues at stake. Russia and the other former Soviet republics are vital as prospective markets for the future economic growth and well-being of the European Union.

Will the purely European second entity—the EU with the WEU—ever be sufficiently mature and united to take on this challenge successfully? There are many doubters and few optimists (and the latter are often found amongst politicians within the EU). Since the Maastricht meeting of December 1991, there has been ever increasing doubt about and criticism of the total unification of Europe, particularly from the average citizens of the long-time, as well as more recent, member countries. This unease was made clear in the referenda that were held prior to the ratification of the European Union Treaty; in each country, a significant minority voted No.<sup>11</sup>

The votes in Austria, Finland, and Sweden for membership in the EU should not be interpreted as wholehearted support for the implications of the Treaty but rather as wishes to be inside, rather than outside, the Union. In the long term, probably no European country is economically strong enough to guarantee growth and well-being for its citizens outside the EU. The Norwegians, in their referendum in November 1994, voted against membership mainly because of their strong economy (based on vast oil resources) and out of concern that their



fishery industry would be hurt by competition within the Union. However, there is now great concern in Norway that staying outside the Union may in the long term weaken the economy; its government will probably hold a second referendum in 1996. Switzerland, another country still outside the EU, did not seek membership, due to its neutrality. Like Norway, Switzerland is worried about the long-term effect on its not very strong economy; Swiss neutrality could prove to be very expensive.

The EU and the WEU will have only the power given to them by their members, and there is today considerable hesitation among them as to how much power they should possess. There is no overwhelming majority of people in any sector that wants to strengthen the EU and WEU at the expense of national sovereignty and regional identity. Even in the area of economic cooperation there are issues that are unsolved because of unwillingness to deemphasize national self-determination. There is a risk that the EU and the WEU may for a long time fit the characterization given by Belgian foreign minister Mark Eysken during the Gulf war: "The EC is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm."<sup>12</sup>

The third entity significant in Europe's future—Nato, perhaps foremost the United States—has won the Cold War. The alliance and the U.S. have since then had problems similar to those of the EU and the WEU in adjusting to the rapid developments in Europe. Several Eastern European states have already expressed their wish to become members of Nato. At home, the U.S. has been and still is debating its future national and military strategy. There are advocates for a variety of directions: isolationism, collective security, and primacy. In July 1994 the Clinton administration finally issued its "National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," committing the U.S. to leadership by encouraging and endorsing democracy and a stable security structure. The strategy (reaffirmed in February 1995) emphasizes the importance of Nato and U.S. forces in Europe—in rough numbers, a continued deployment of about a hundred thousand troops. The newly created Partnership for Peace (PFP) provides a vital context: "With the adoption of the U.S. initiative, [the] Partnership for Peace, at the January 1994 summit, NATO is playing an increasingly important role in our strategy of European integration, extending the scope of our security cooperation to the new democracies of Europe. Twenty-five nations, including Russia, have already joined the partnership, which will pave the way for a growing program of military cooperation and political consultation. . . . In keeping with our strategy of enlargement, [the] PFP is open to all former members of the Warsaw Pact as well as other European states. . . . As the President has made clear, NATO expansion will not be aimed at replacing one division of Europe with a new

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one, but to enhance the security of all European states, members and non-members alike."<sup>13</sup>

Russian military and civilian spokesmen have used harsh language in protesting any expansion of Nato. The foreign minister has gone so far as to declare that enlarging Nato would create "a buffer zone that could be crushed in any situation." Similarly, the defense minister, Marshal Pavel Grachev, has insisted that "Russia cannot allow Poland to be admitted into Nato."<sup>14</sup> During the latest OSCE summit in Budapest, plans for an extended Nato resulted in a verbal clash between presidents Clinton and Yeltsin: the two clearly disagreed on the role Nato ought to play in coming years. In particular, Yeltsin denounced plans for extension of its security guarantees to certain former Soviet satellites: "Europe, not having yet freed itself from the heritage of the Cold War, is in danger of plunging into a cold peace. Why sow the seeds of mistrust? After all, we are no longer enemies, we are partners."<sup>15</sup>

During the Cold War, the two superpowers carefully respected each other's sphere of interest. This concern was reflected in the events of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Grenada and Panama during the 1980s. The reason was simple: neither superpower had vital interests within the other's sphere. Therefore it is hard to believe that the U.S., and hence Nato, has a vital interest in giving extensive security guarantees to, for example, the Baltic states or Poland. There is an obvious risk that the Partnership for Peace will be an everlasting "waiting room," of insignificant importance, for Eastern European states who now strive toward membership in Nato. To add members from among former communist states in the vicinity of Russia would not lead to détente in Europe. If we are fortunate enough to see Eastern Europe and Russia take a turn for the better, Nato will probably, in the long term, evolve into an organization having more political and fewer military overtones.

The fourth entity important to European security policy, and hence to Sweden's decisions, is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Since its origins in Helsinki in 1975, OSCE has negotiated and implemented an array of confidence-building measures. These CBMs have undoubtedly contributed to reducing misperception of various military deployments and exercises. In addition, OSCE has in recent years expanded its activities by involvement in peace-making efforts in former Yugoslavia and in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. These efforts have been partly coordinated with the WEU, but so far they have not been especially successful. The very number and diversity of its members—fifty-three nations, spanning the globe from Vancouver to Vladivostok—make it impossible for this organization to speak with one voice.<sup>16</sup>

Not surprisingly, the policy trends and possible future development of these main actors—Russia, EU and WEU, Nato, and to a lesser extent, the OSCE—point to no clear and mechanistic conclusions regarding the threat to Sweden. The rate of change in Europe is still rapid and will probably continue to be so for another decade or two. It is too early to perceive a stable threat spectrum that will influence northern Europe. Therefore Sweden must realize that the future has uncertainties and unknowns that will affect its own security policy.

The risk of a third world war has faded away, but new possibilities, like a revanchist and expansive Russia, regional conflicts, terrorism, organized crime, and uncontrolled floods of refugees, have emerged. An important observation is that the threat spectrum of today and tomorrow has become less predictable and more complicated than that of yesterday. A worst-case scenario may be a Nato exerting less credible military deterrence, weakened Western European cooperation within the EU and WEU, and an expansive, rearmed Russia. A future Swedish security policy must contribute to preventing, or if necessary handling, such a situation.

### What Are the Possible Solutions?

What are the possible and achievable security policies for Sweden, as a member of the EU? The defense minister, it will be recalled, has clearly defined one alternative: "Sweden will participate fully in CFSP, as established in the Maastricht Agreement. As far as Sweden is concerned it means a commitment to be responsible for our own defense so that we can remain neutral in the event of war in our vicinity. Sweden is only responsible for its own defense."<sup>17</sup> But in the new situation in Europe, in the post-Cold War era, there are other feasible choices. Three concrete and achievable alternatives for Sweden are: to remain nonaligned with respect to any military alliance and claim neutrality in event of war, to apply for membership in Nato, and to apply for full membership in the Western European Union.

**Nonalignment and Neutrality.** The EU is developing within a Western European society that is highly computerized, economically integrated, and benefiting from an enormous flow of information and the activities of multinational corporations. Sweden will be a part of an organization striving to be a unified community founded on solidarity amongst its members. Would it then be possible to exclude certain Swedish security assets when they are most needed, in times of crisis or war in Europe, by arguing that they should be used solely for the defense of Sweden?

When advocating Swedish membership in the EU but also nonalignment and neutrality in the event of war, Swedish politicians often use the Republic of

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Ireland as an example. Ireland has long been a neutral member of the EU and is, therefore, not a member of the WEU; but Ireland has a strategic situation completely different from that of Sweden. Ireland, west of Great Britain, is far from Russia, far from its nuclear capability on the Kola Peninsula, and far from the former communist states of Eastern Europe. Hence, the argument that Sweden can copy the Irish solution is not valid. Furthermore, it is doubtful if a country that is deeply engaged in an economic and political union can really, according to international law, claim neutrality. If it does, can that neutrality have any credibility? It would certainly not be credible to any country that was opposed to, or in conflict with, a member of the EU.

The core question remains: Can Sweden achieve its stated objectives by dividing its security policy into two dimensions, one within the EU and one claiming a neutrality of doubtful credibility? In such a situation Sweden would gain little military security from the other members but would nonetheless be looked upon as aligned with the EU's security arrangements. To divide its resources and effectively "stand alone" in a Europe whose future is thick with uncertainty is the worst alternative. It gives Sweden only the security the nation can achieve by itself, and it forfeits the strength that can be drawn from collective arrangements. Neutrality and freedom from alliances had value during the days of the Cold War; that intrinsic value has been sharply reduced, if not completely eliminated, for the Europe of today and tomorrow.

Sweden, with relatively limited resources, would be better able to achieve its objectives through the weight and power of an alignment or alliance. If it should seek security cooperation within an alliance or alignment, there are two alternatives: to apply for membership in Nato (and, by entering Nato, gaining membership in the WEU), or to seek to join the WEU only.

***Collective Security within Nato.*** A daily Swedish newspaper with nationwide circulation has editorialized that Sweden should apply for membership in Nato as soon as possible. Its main reason is the rather extensive reduction of the Swedish defense budget currently being discussed by the Social Democratic government. If it should take place, the argument goes, the Swedish defense forces will have difficulty in maintaining credible deterrence against aggression and will not be adequate to defend the country in case of assault. Therefore, the newspaper concludes, Sweden needs the military assistance and security guarantees that membership in Nato would give. This view, and the perception of Nato as a simple and cheap solution, reflect a surprising naiveté in the public debate. Should Nato accept a future Swedish application for membership, it would most certainly do so with the condition that Sweden contribute resources of at least the same strength and quality as its present armed forces. In fact, there is a general opinion in the United States that its allies in Europe and in Asia with

strong economies ought to make greater contributions to the defense of their own regions.

Nato membership—assuming that the alliance would accept Sweden, which is far from certain—does have appeal. To be a member of the most powerful military organization ever established would bring security in the shape of deterrence and, in conflict, vast military resources. But Swedish membership would also draw a new line in Europe, one that would be farther east than it used to be, closer to Russia and to one of its most important security interests, the Kola Peninsula. Furthermore, Swedish membership in Nato would have great impact on Finland. In recent years Finland has succeeded in loosening ties with Russia dating back to the termination of World War II. It has been a drawn-out process and not without difficulties. Sweden's role in "Nordic stability"—i.e., as a neutral country between a Nato member, Norway, in the west and Finland in the east—probably facilitated Finland's success. Swedish Nato membership could be perceived by Russia as a threat, particularly if any of the former Warsaw Pact countries were also moving toward the alliance. To avoid being bullied into a new security arrangement with Russia, Finland would probably be forced to apply for membership as well. Such a development would most certainly make less benign the present positive trend in relations between Russia and Western Europe. By becoming a Nato member, therefore, Sweden would create a paradox: a higher degree of security but increased tension in northern Europe and thereby a greater risk of being involved in a crisis or a conflict.

Thus, Nato membership would only superficially achieve the objectives of Swedish security policy. That solution would not support the important components of Swedish security policy that concern the defusing of tension, arms reduction, cooperation and democratic development, and contributing to lasting peace and stability in Scandinavia and surrounding areas. In all of these aims the ultimate objective is to reduce the risk of Sweden becoming involved in or being affected by war. There remains, therefore, only one alternative: to apply for membership in the WEU only.

**Collective Security within the EU.** To provide security for its members, the European Union will try to foster, through the CFSP and the WEU, peace and stability in Europe. In accepting the European Union Treaty Sweden has also accepted the CFSP, which is a commitment to work with other members to achieve the objectives of the Union—which are the same as those on Sweden's agenda. If the EU is to achieve those aims, each member must cooperate to the best of its ability and contribute with all means available. The armed forces of each member, together with diplomacy and strong economies, are important elements in this process. Sweden has competent and relatively strong armed

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forces; in fact, it is militarily the strongest of the three new members. Furthermore, Sweden has gained a good reputation throughout the international community and a great deal of experience from taking part in several UN peacekeeping missions. Clearly, the armed forces of Sweden can contribute to the goals of the EU.

As noted, the path toward a peaceful and democratic Europe is filled with pitfalls and problems. To become a member of the WEU is, therefore, no guarantee of achieving the objectives of Sweden's security policy, but it gives the nation an opportunity to influence developments in a direction consistent with its interests. In addition, Swedish membership in the WEU strengthens the collective security arrangements of Europe and in turn the security of Sweden. Hence, this alternative would seem to avoid the tensions associated with an expanded Nato, add to Sweden's defense, and contribute to unity of effort in Europe. These arguments suggest that full membership in the Western European Union is a solution that has lower risks, less uncertainty, and fewer unknowns than the other alternatives; furthermore, it increases Sweden's and Europe's ability to prepare for any anticipated dangers of the future.

As a member of the WEU, Sweden ought especially to contribute in a number of areas.

- *Fostering cooperation and confidence* through active diplomacy within the WEU, as well as between the WEU and the former communist states of Eastern Europe (especially Russia and Ukraine). The WEU is not yet the fully structured defense organization needed to serve the EU. During the buildup phase, it is essential that all members, particularly such nations as Sweden, actively engage themselves to bring about an organization that serves small nations as well as more powerful countries.

- *Integrating the former communist states* of Eastern Europe into the security structure.

- *Coordinating the WEU with the OSCE*, strengthening both organizations. Today the interface within the security structure of Europe, containing Nato, the OSCE, and the EU and WEU, is somewhat vague as to responsibilities and missions. The future European security structure needs to clarify the missions and responsibilities of the organizations in order to facilitate unity of effort.

- *Providing armed forces that are strong and well balanced*, able to deter and to defend Swedish territory against any aggression. Sweden has the military capability, the infrastructure, and the economic means necessary to sustain forces capable of crisis management, deterrence, and defense.

- *Taking part in peacekeeping missions*. Besides well trained units, Sweden can contribute extensive experience in peacekeeping missions and also specially designed training for various kinds of peacekeeping units. Furthermore, Sweden

should influence the development of the WEU toward an organization that acts as a peacekeeper within a mandate given by the UN or the OSCE.

- *Providing peace enforcement forces* that are ready, equipped, and trained for peace enforcement missions within a mandate given by the UN or the OSCE. If necessary, the WEU, either in cooperation with Nato or alone, must be able to conduct peace enforcement. This ability should be used primarily for deterrence but, if need be, can be employed to avoid further instability such as that seen in former Yugoslavia.

### The Right Time, and High Time

For the moment, there is no immediate and overwhelming threat to Sweden. Europe is undergoing a rapid and fundamental transformation from the Cold War into something that is, so far, unknown. It is to be hoped that the result will be a peaceful continent with more cooperation and with less tension between nations. But the road toward the Europe of tomorrow contains numerous possibilities and challenges; to be able to take on the challenges and capitalize on the possibilities, Sweden needs a security policy that is adjusted to the new situation. Now is the right time—and it is high time—to consider carefully and then decide upon a new course toward fulfillment of Swedish security policy's objectives. It is essential for Sweden to choose a solution that will be valid into the next century, that is flexible, and that is able to influence the developments of the emerging collective security system of the new Europe.

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### Notes

1. As a result of the Maastricht meeting of December 1991, the European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) in January 1994.
2. Swedish Ministry of Defense, *Swedish Defense* (Stockholm: 1993), p. 14.
3. Swedish Defense Headquarters, *Facts and Figures: Swedish Defense 1994/95* (Stockholm: 1994), p. 4.
4. Bundessprachenamt (Federal Republic of Germany Information Agency) SI 1, *European Security in the 90's* (Bonn: January 1994), p. 10.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
6. Swedish Ministry of Defense, *Defense Made in Sweden: Speeches by Defense Minister Mr. Anders Björk* (Stockholm: 1992), p. 7.
7. Erik Rossander, "Betydande rysk kapacitet kan åter utvecklas," *Arménytt*, February 1994, p. 14.
8. *Defense Made in Sweden*, p. 10.
9. Swedish Defense Headquarters, *Info Nytt*, no. 4/95 (Stockholm: 2 February 1995), pp. 6–7.
10. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1994, p. 71.
11. In Denmark the majority actually voted No, which meant substantial problems for the EC. The issue was solved by giving Denmark explicit exceptions from the treaty.
12. Ronald D. Asmus et al., "Building a New Nato," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1993, p. 31.
13. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (The White House: February 1995), pp. 26–7.
14. Brzezinski, p. 77.
15. *Providence Journal Bulletin*, 6 December 1994, p. A7.
16. Asmus et al., p. 31.
17. *Defense Made in Sweden*, p. 7.